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COMMENT
Olmstead v. L.C. and the Voluntary Cessation
Doctrine: Toward a More Holistic Analysis of the
"Effectively Worldng Plan"
Disability advocates have heralded Olmstead v. L. C.' as "the Brown v. Board
of Education for the law of disability discrimination."2 Olmstead concerned a pair
of women with mental illnesses institutionalized at a state psychiatric hospital.
State medical employees agreed that both women could be treated in a
community-based program. However, the state refused to grant their requests
for placement in such a program.3 The two women filed suit, asserting a
protected interest in receiving state-provided treatment services in an
integrated setting rather than an institutional one.4 Finding in their favor, the
Supreme Court held that unnecessary segregation of individuals with
disabilities constitutes discrimination under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.s
Ten years after the Court's decision, comparisons with Brown have proved
apt if inauspicious. In Olmstead, the Court reasoned that institutional
placement of individuals capable of living in the community "perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions" about such individuals and "severely diminishes"
their quality of life.6 In so doing, it echoed the mantra in Brown: separate is
1. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
2. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Qu4agmire, 47 UCLA L. Rrv. 653, 654 (2000).
3. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593.
4. Id. at 593-94.
5. Id. at 597-600.
6. Id. at 6oo-ol. The Court found that restrictive institutional settings promote assumptions
that "persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life" and
reduce "family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
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inherently unequal.7 Yet a plurality of the Court tempered Olmstead's
integration mandate by recognizing an affirmative "fundamental alteration"
defense.8 The plurality indicated that a state would meet this defense if it has a
"comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with
mental disabilities in less restrictive settings."9 This vague deference to state
plans has occasioned a struggle for enforcement comparable to the struggle
that followed Brown. °
This Comment argues that the federal courts have embarked on a path of
judicial interpretation that threatens to render the "working plan" provision in
Olmstead a "get out of jail free" card for states otherwise in violation of the
decision's integration mandate. Courts have split between a pair of problematic
approaches in assessing plans: a retrospective approach and a prospective
approach. The retrospective approach gives undue weight to past state actions;
the prospective approach relies uncritically on state promises to take future
action. To ensure that states cannot successfully invoke the "working plan"
provision in the absence of a genuine commitment to integration and
deinstitutionalization, this Comment urges courts to analyze plans under the
voluntary cessation doctrine. This approach would examine both past conduct
and present assurances to assess the likelihood of future compliance.
The argument progresses as follows. Part I discusses the present split in the
federal courts of appeals between the prospective and retrospective approaches
advancement, and cultural enrichment." Id. For additional discussion of the negative effects
of institutional segregation, see, for example, Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 440-57 (1991).
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). This parallel is an imperfect one. Many
individuals with disabilities do best in a combination of integrated and segregated settings.
See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1415, 1483 (2007) ("The mantra 'separate is inherently unequal' needs to be replaced
with the slogan 'invidious segregation is inherently unequal."'). Hence, Olmstead focuses on
"unjustified" institutional isolation. 527 U.S. at 6oo.
8. States meet this defense if they can show that under the present "allocation of available
resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility
the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of
persons with mental disabilities." Id. at 604. Lower courts have adopted this definition. See,
e.g., Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 632 (D. Md. 2001) ("[T]he few courts
that have confronted this question have followed the approach used in Olmstead.").
9. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-o6 (plurality opinion).
1o. Where school districts tested how much speed is "deliberate speed," state institutional
systems have tested how effective is "effectively working." Compare Robert B. McKay, "With
All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1956) (analyzing
the law's response to state efforts to delay school integration), with Jennifer Mathis, Where
Are We Five Years After Olmstead?, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 561 (analyzing
recent litigation concerning the boundaries of the fundamental alteration defense).
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to assessing state working plans. Part II explains the voluntary cessation
doctrine and argues that it can be applied to state working plans. Finally, Part
III applies the voluntary cessation doctrine to state working plans and
demonstrates how this approach will provide the relief that Olmstead mandates.
I. OLMSTEAD WORKING PLANS AND THE COURTS
The plurality in Olmstead provided scant guidance concerning the necessary
conditions for a state working plan to be "comprehensive" and "effectively
working."" In its most favorable light, this may reflect "recognition of the
limited capacity of courts to shoulder the burden of significant social change on
their own." 2 In its least favorable light, however, the indeterminate language
may allow states to proceed with merely symbolic changes. 13 The federal courts
have split between a retrospective approach to analyzing working plans and a
prospective approach. The difference between these approaches can be gleaned
from applying them to the following hypothetical.
In the past three decades, a state has been moving individuals from
institutional settings into community-based settings at a rate comparable to the
national average. Continued progress toward community integration would
require an increase in expenditures, however, and state leaders do not intend to
make these outlays. A class of institutionalized individuals with disabilities at
one of the state's psychiatric hospitals has requested placements that would
allow the individuals to participate in the community. State medical employees
agree that each class member can receive adequate treatment in a community-
based program. Aware of the Court's decision in Olmstead and concerned about
a lawsuit, the state issues a written plan to reduce the number of state
institutional beds by 25o annually over the next five years. Pointing to its plan,
the state places the class members on a waiting list.
ii. The plurality merely noted that such a plan would have a "waiting list that moved at a
reasonable pace" that is "not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-o6 (plurality opinion).
12. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding "We the People": The
Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 58 (2004).
13. See Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the
Future of Community Integration for Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1221,
1262 (1999) ("[S]tates sometimes mask inappropriate motivations under the guise of more
acceptable ones.").
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A. The Retrospective Approach
The retrospective approach examines whether a state has demonstrated a
past commitment to deinstitutionalization. Anchored by a pair of Ninth Circuit
decisions, courts adopting this approach have invariably found for state
defendants. 14 They have held that a general history of deinstitutionalization,
even absent stated goals or guidelines, may be enough to satisfy Olmstead's
working plan requirement.'" In Arc of Washington State Inc. v. Braddock, for
example, the Ninth Circuit held that the State of Washington had an effectively
working plan based on findings that the State's institutional population had
declined by twenty percent from 1994 to 20Ol and that its expenditures on
community services had doubled in the same period. 6
Confronted with our hypothetical case, a court applying the retrospective
approach would almost certainly find that the state has a comprehensive,
effectively working plan. Although the written plan might reassure the court, it
would not be necessary to uphold the state's actions. Even if the hypothetical
state's program has not moved on pace with the program considered in
Braddock, lower courts have discerned working plans from equally vague
histories of deinstitutionalization. 17 Most notably, a federal district court in
Maryland found that the state had an effectively working plan based on
testimony that it was "gradually closing institutions and expanding the
number and range of community-based treatment programs."' 8
B. The Prospective Approach
The prospective approach examines whether a state has expressed a
reasonably specific commitment to move individuals with disabilities from
institutional settings into community-based settings. Primarily in the Third
Circuit,"9 these courts have held that courts may "discharge" their
14. See Arc of Wash. State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3 d 615 (9 th Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Johnson,
416 F.3 d 1O51 (9th Cir. 2005); Bryson v. Stephen, No. 99-CV-558-SM, 2oo6 WL 2805238
(D.N.H. Sept. 29, 20o6); Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2001).
is. See, e.g., Sanchez, 416 F.3d at io68 (upholding California's plan given its "successful record"
and unspecific programs "to continue and to increase" these efforts).
16. Braddock, 427 F.3d at 621.
17. See, e.g., Bryson, 2006 WL 2805238, at *5-7; Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 633-38.
18. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
ig. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. II), 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Pa.
Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2005); Frederick
L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 1), 364 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2004); Kathleen S. v. Dep't
io16
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responsibilities under Olmstead upon confirming that a "general plan does
exist."2 In Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare, the Third Circuit held
that Pennsylvania's mental health department needed to "be prepared to make
a commitment to action in a manner for which it can be held accountable by
the courts."'" The court's only stated requirement, however, was that the plan
be "communicated in some manner."' It added in a later opinion that plans
must be "reasonably specific and measurable." 3
A court employing the prospective approach almost certainly would find
that the state in our hypothetical case has an adequate plan. The state has not
only communicated a plan; it has communicated a plan with specific and
measurable goals. The Third Circuit considered a nearly identical case in which
Pennsylvania initially expressed a goal of reducing state institutional beds by at
least 250 annually. 4 At the time of suit, the state presented the court with a
different version of the plan, which included the "more amorphous" and
"non-specific" goal of reducing the institutional population by "up to 250 beds"
annually."5 This goal would have been met by a zero bed reduction and did not
pass muster; the court implied, however, that a goal of 250 beds would have
been acceptable.
Neither of these approaches provides adequate assurance of future
compliance with Olmstead's integration mandate. Past actions may be
discontinued, and future promises may go unfulfilled.26 That a state has acted
appropriately in the past or promises to do so in the future may demonstrate
that it has a comprehensive plan, but it does not suffice to demonstrate that it
has an effectively working plan.
of Pub. Welfare, No. 97-661o, 1999 WL 1257284 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1999); Makin ex rel.
Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 1999).
20. Pa. Prot. &Advocacy, 402 F.3d at 382.
21. Frederick L. 1, 364 F.3d at 500.
22. Id.
23. Frederick L. 11, 422 F. 3d at 157. The court noted that "general assurances and good-faith
intentions" are not sufficient. Id. at 158.
24. Id. at 157-58.
25. Id.
26. See Mathis, supra note lo, at 581 (noting that many states have demonstrated "something
less than a strong commitment to Olmstead compliance").
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II. THE VOLUNTARY CESSATION DOCTRINE
An alternative approach to analyzing working plans under Olmstead would
treat a state's adoption of a plan as voluntary cessation of illegal conduct. It is
well established in mootness doctrine that courts will not decide cases in which
"the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome. '27 Courts have made exceptions to this principle; one
exception holds that a defendant's voluntary cessation of illegal conduct does
not necessarily render a case moot., s As one court has declared, "A controversy
still smoulders when the defendant has voluntarily, but not necessarily
permanently, ceased to engage in the allegedly wrongful conduct." 29
Voluntary cessation of illegal behavior renders a case moot if the behavior
has indeed ceased and "subsequent events [make] it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."3 if the
questionable behavior has ceased, a plaintiff may show that "there exists some
cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere
possibility."3' The defendant will then face the "heavy" burden of proving that
the wrong will not be repeated. 2 The Court's ensuing analysis considers "the
bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the
discontinuance, and, in some cases, the character of past violations. ''33
Under this rubric, a legally cognizable reversal of policy must be both
"overt and visible" and have "every appearance of being permanent."3 4 Courts
are particularly wary of "efforts to defeat injunctive relief... [that] seem timed
to anticipate suit"35 and will not rely on a mere promise of future compliance. 6
In assessing the likelihood that present assurances will produce a reversal of
27. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,496 (1969).
28. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 34S U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
zg. Hooker Chem. Co. v. U.S. EPA, Region II, 642 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1981).
30. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199
, 203 (1968)).
31. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34- United States v. Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 334 (1952).
35. Id.; see also James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that actions taken to anticipate a lawsuit do not indicate that the practice sought to be
enjoined would not be repeated).
36. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633; see also United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453,
456 n.6 (1983) ("The possibility that respondent may change its mind in the future is
sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness.")
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policy, courts consider past behavior indicative of a genuine commitment to
compliance.3 7 For example, one court held that while the construction of a new
and sanitary prison facility might eliminate temporary overcrowding and poor
conditions, it did not assure future compliance with the Eighth Amendment
because "filth can accumulate in new buildings" and "new buildings can be
made intolerably overcrowded.",
8
Courts have applied this analysis in cases where neither the defendant nor
the court raised the question of mootness, but the defendant sought to avoid
liability by ceasing questionable conduct.39 In NAACP v. City of Evergreen, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit considered a class action that alleged racially
discriminatory city hiring practices, which were discontinued in the face of
litigation. 40 While the district court had reasoned that no relief could be
granted absent a present violation, the court of appeals held that "in cases
presenting abundant evidence of consistent past discrimination, injunctive
relief is mandatory absent clear and convincing proof that there is no reasonable
probability of further noncompliance with the law. 4
1
Given the application of a voluntary cessation approach outside the context
of mootness doctrine, courts would not be stepping out of bounds to apply it
to state working plans. The next Part contends that the approach better
matches the plurality's language in Olmstead than the prospective and
retrospective approaches.
III.VOLUNTARY CESSATION AND OLMSTEAD WORKING PLANS
A voluntary cessation approach to assessing working plans would
disentangle judicial inquiries into Olmstead's dual requirements that a plan be
both "comprehensive" and "effectively working."42 These requirements parallel
37. See, e.g., Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying a mootness
claim "given the history of defendants' grudging resistance, the ineffectiveness of their
previous efforts at compliance and the 'flagrant and shocking' character of their past
violations").
38. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5 th Cir. 1981).
39. These cases have ranged in concern from antitrust to searches and seizures to discrimination
under Title VII. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 200-03 (4 th Cir. 1966) (searches and
seizures); Bd. of Regents v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletics Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1327 (W.D.
Okla. 1982) (antitrust); Thompson v. Boyle, No. 74-11Ol, 1980 WL 2095, at *3 (D.D.C. May
20, 198o) (employment discrimination).
40. 693 F.2d 1367 (iith Cir. 1982).
41. Id. at 1370.
42. 527 U.S. 581, 605 (1999) (plurality opinion).
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the dual inquiries under the voluntary cessation doctrine of (1) whether the
defendant has indeed ceased the conduct in question, and (2) whether that
conduct can be reasonably expected to recur. States that assert a working plan
defense in effect claim that they are no longer engaged in discriminatory
conduct and promise that they will continue to comply with Olmstead's
integration mandate.
Under the voluntary cessation approach, courts would first address
whether a state's plan, on its face, can be considered a cessation of the
discriminatory policies that have prolonged unnecessary institutionalization.
This inquiry would solely assess the substantive adequacy of the proffered
plan, ignoring the likelihood of its implementation.43 In making this
assessment, courts would draw on the substantive standards developed under
the prospective and retrospective approaches outlined above. To the extent that
a voluntary cessation approach would unify existing doctrine under a single
framework, it would require courts to negotiate the different substantive
standards employed by those approaches. However, the approach leaves open
the question of what substantive standards are appropriate for plans. 44
If a court determines that a plan can be considered a cessation of past
discriminatory policies, the voluntary cessation approach would then inquire
into whether the state can be expected to follow its plan. Plaintiffs would have
the opportunity to present evidence to demonstrate a cognizable danger of
continued discrimination-namely, an unimplemented plan.45 Upon such a
showing, the state would have to demonstrate that expectations of future
discriminatory practices would be unreasonable given the permanence of the
plan, the state's bona fides, and the character of past behavior. 46 This inquiry
would combine elements from the prospective and retrospective approaches;
that is, courts would look at a state's promised behavior in light of its past
43. This analysis tracks the inquiry under the prospective approach into whether a plan exists.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
44. Some substantive minimum would be essential. The voluntary cessation approach can only
assure that states comply with their plans; compliance with substantively inadequate plans
would achieve little.
4s. To raise this possibility, plaintiffs could point to past state violations or other evidence of
duplicity.
46. As is typical under the voluntary cessation doctrine, this would be a fact-intensive and
equitable decision. Courts would be pressed to consider how the plan was devised, the
state's measures for enforcement, and the credibility of state officials, among other factors.
1020
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actions to determine whether the state is likely to implement its plan in the
future.47
To return to our hypothetical case, a court would likely find the state's plan
inadequate under the voluntary cessation approach. The first part of the
inquiry would find the plan substantively comprehensive under current
doctrine; as discussed above, it meets the substantive requirements of both the
retrospective and prospective approaches. 48 The state's plan would fail the
second part of the inquiry, however. The plaintiff would be able to
demonstrate a threat of recurrent violation given that the state did not develop
a plan until threatened with a lawsuit.49 The state would then have a difficult
time proving that its plan is permanent and in good faith, given that state
leaders expressed internally that they did not intend to expend the resources
necessary for continued progress toward community integration.
CONCLUSION
Questions of good faith, clean hands, and opportunism have long occupied
the realm of equity. If the present approaches to working plans are any
indication, however, there are instances when legal doctrine should help ferret
out these concerns. Surely, repeated lawsuits against a state that has neither
fulfilled its promises nor continued acceptable past behavior would prompt
even the most deferential courts to deny assertions that a plan is "effectively
working." Yet to rely on protracted litigation allows states to drag their feet
toward Olmstead compliance while people who have a legal right to live in the
community must remain apart from it.
JOHN F. MULLER
47- Courts and advocates could build a voluntary cessation framework upon existing doctrine.
Some courts have combined elements of the two approaches already. See Sanchez v.
Johnson, 416 F.3d lo51, 1o67 (9 th Cit. 2005) (taking into account both past efforts and a yet
unimplemented program).
48. See supra notes 19, 23-24 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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